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The International Law Gaze: Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes (New Zealand) 
Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, University of Waikato, on a big win for New Zealand at the WTO 
 
The results in inter-State litigation seldom permit comparisons with competitive sports. A rare 
exception is the panel report of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Indonesia – Importation of 
Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products [Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes]. The score 
at the first stage of this litigation is New Zealand 18 – Indonesia 0. New Zealand and the United States, 
separately, challenged 18 of Indonesia’s import restrictions adopted since 2011, which were aimed at 
protecting the local beef and horticultural industries (the measures), and the panel declared that all 
of them were contrary to the law of the WTO. New Zealand’s like industries may see the end of their 
problems in Indonesia on the horizon. The win, though, is not definitive, since the latter has appealed 
the report before the WTO Appellate Body. (World Trade Organization, Notification of an Appeal by 
Indonesia under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, 21 February 2017). 
 
The Trade Impact and the Legal Basis of the Dispute 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the adverse trade impact of the import 
restrictions on New Zealand’s beef and horticultural products was between 0.5 and 1 billion dollars, 
and the reduction in volume of exports was 80% since the measures had been adopted. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Current Disputes. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trade-law-and-
dispute-settlement/current-disputes/). Indonesia argued that the purpose of the measures was to 
ensure food security and sovereignty, not minor goals and often invoked by States in all continents. 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [2.4] & [2.7]).  However, New Zealand claimed that the import 
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restrictions constituted violation of Article XI.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT 
1994]. This provision sets forth: 
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
1.   No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party 
 
The reason for the existence of this prohibition is to induce WTO members to protect their industries 
with tariffs and not with quantitative restrictions: “A basic principle of the GATT system is that tariffs 
are the preferred and acceptable form of protection … The prohibition against quantitative restrictions 
is a reflection that tariffs are GATT’s border protection ‘of choice.’” (WTO Panel Report, Turkey – 
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products at [9.63]). 
 
The purpose of Article XI.1 is to make international trade much more transparent. Duties and charges 
are generally easy to determine, and exporters know how much they have to pay to export to a given 
foreign market. On the contrary, quantitative restrictions create uncertainties for exporters. (Legal 
and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), 2014 at 123 
& 143). There are some exceptions to this prohibition, provided for in other parts of Article XI; only 
one of them is relevant to this case and will be briefly mentioned below. 
 
The Interpretation of GATT Article XI by the Panel 
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The panel started its analysis by defining the legal test for the application of Article XI.1, based on the 
Appellate Body’s and other panels’ reports. The test had two steps: (a) the measure in question falls 
under Article XI.1; and if so (b) the measure constituted a prohibition or a restriction on importation 
or exportation. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.40]).  For the sake of brevity, and given that 
the panel regarded that all of the measures met the first step, this piece will concentrate on the second 
step. In this regard, the panel, following the Appellate Body, stated that “only those prohibitions and 
restrictions that limit the quantity or amount of a product being imported (or exported) would fall 
within the scope of [Article XI.1].” (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.44]). 
 
The panel then expanded on the limiting effect of imports, and stated, also on the basis of past WTO 
panel reports, that such effect took place whenever the measures limited the competitive 
opportunities of imported products. Going even further, the panel pointed out that among those 
measures were those that introduced uncertainties affecting importation, made imports highly 
expensive or unpredictable, or granted authorities unlimited or undefined discretion to reject 
importing licences. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.46]). Finally, the panel expressed that 
a violation of Article XI.1 did not require evidence of the adverse trade effect in the form of 
quantification of reduction of imports, and that the limitation imposed by a measure could be proven 
through its design, architecture, and structure.  (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.47]-[7.50]). 
 
The Panel’s Analysis of the Measures 
The first set of measures adopted by Indonesia provided for a limited application window to get 
licences to import horticultural products and certain animal products, such as beef. ((Indonesia – 
Import Licences Regimes at [7.77] & [7.314]). The panel developed hypothetical models and found 
that as a result of the operation of the measures there would be periods of time in which importation 
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of horticultural and beef products to Indonesia would not take place. (Indonesia – Import Licences 
Regimes at [7.81] – [7.86] & [7.318] – [7.323]). The conclusion was supported by New Zealand’s 
evidence of exports to Indonesia. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.88]). On these bases, the 
panel determined that these measures limited the competitive opportunities of importers and were, 
therefore, contrary to GATT Article XI.1. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.91 & [7.326]). 
 
The second measure set forth the declaration that terms of approval of imports could not be changed 
in terms of the type of horticultural products, the quantity, the country of origin, and the Indonesian 
port of entry. Lack of compliance could lead to the destruction of the products or to their re-export at 
the importers’ costs. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.105]). The panel found that this 
measure operated as an import quota, because the approved quantity could not be changed; and that 
the measure introduced inflexibility to the importation process of horticultural products, because 
importers were not able to react to market conditions. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.109] 
– [7.110]). For these reasons, the panel concluded, the measure limited imports of the said products. 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.111]). A similar strict measure was adopted regarding the 
import of animal and animal products, and the panel, for similar reasons, arrived at the identical 
conclusion. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.341] – [3.347]).  
 
The third measure established that the importation of horticultural products could not take place 
within certain periods prior to, during, and after the harvesting season of the same Indonesian 
products. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.148]). The panel, relying on adverse trade effects 
proven by the United States, concluded that there was no room for competition when the imported 
products could not enter the Indonesian market at certain times. As a result, the measure was contrary 




The fourth set of measures that applied to both horticultural and beef products required importers to 
own storage facilities to hold the quantities that they had requested in the import applications. As a 
result, importers could not import volumes that they could not store in their own facilities, even if 
they could rent additional facilities to store additional imports. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes 
at [7.175]). The panel stated that the measure “explicitly limits the volume of imports of horticultural 
products by a given importer to the maximum amount that the importer can store in its own facilities.” 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.175]). On this main basis, the panel concluded that this 
measure was contrary to Article XI.1. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.179]). 
 
The fifth measure established reference prices for chillies and fresh shallots. Importation was 
suspended once the market price fell below the reference price and resumed once the former 
exceeded the latter. The Indonesia Ministry of Trade set the prices after taking into account farmers’ 
operational costs and their profit margins and a reasonable price for domestic consumers. The 
reference prices could be evaluated at any time and were not published. Imports were suspended 
even if the price of imported products was above the reference price. (Indonesia – Import Licences 
Regimes at [7.214] – [219]).  The panel stated that this measure operated as a temporary ban and, 
therefore, was contrary to Article XI.1. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.221]).  The panel 
went further. It stated that the measure was trade restrictive even when it was not operating, for it 
“creates uncertainties and incentives for importers to limit the quantities they import.” (Indonesia – 
Import Licences Regimes at [7.222]). A similar price reference system was put in place for beef, with 
an identical operation.  (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.444]), and the panel declared the 
system to be contrary to Article XI.1 for the same reasons. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at 




The sixth measure was the requirement that all imported horticultural products be harvested less than 
six months before importation. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.238]).The panel did not 
have trouble in concluding that the measure was an import ban that contravened Article XI.1, for those 
products that had been harvested more than six months ago could not be imported to Indonesia. 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.241]).     
 
The seventh measure contained a domestic purchase requirement of beef for importers of large 
ruminant meats.  (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.419]).The panel found that the effect of 
the requirement was to substitute imported products with domestic products, thereby limiting 
imports. As a result, this measure was contrary to Article XI.1. as well. (Indonesia – Import Licences 
Regimes at [7.426] – [7.428]). 
 
The eight measure established that importation of animal and animal products and horticultural 
products depended on Indonesia’s determination of the lack of domestic supply to absorb local 
demand. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.494]). The panel found easily that this measure 
limited imports. The panel also noted that this measure also created uncertainties for importers 
regarding when imports would be authorized or banned. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at 
[7.496] – [7.499]). 
 
Finally, New Zealand also claimed that not only each individual measure, but also the entire Indonesian 
licencing regime for the importation of horticultural products and animal and animal products were 
contrary to Article XI. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.244] & [7.453).  The panel agreed on 
the ground that the measures interacted with each other and exacerbated the limiting effects on 




After all of these determinations, and in an attempt to counteract any potential criticisms based on 
an apparent excessive promotion of international trade, the panel did find it important to highlight 
that “[WTO] members are free to pursue food and farm development objectives as they deem 
appropriate, provided they are not implemented through WTO inconsistent measures.” (Indonesia – 
Import Licences Regimes at [7.500]). 
 
Indonesia’s Defences and the Panel’s Decisions 
In addition to challenging the claims of violation made by New Zealand, Indonesia raised several 
defences. 
 
First, Indonesia argued that some of the measures were the result of private actors’ actions and not 
measures maintained by Indonesia as a WTO member; therefore, they were beyond the jurisdiction 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.4]).  The panel 
responded by quoting the Appellate Body: “Where private actors are induced or encouraged to take 
certain decisions because of the incentives created by the measure, those decisions are not 
‘independent’ of that measure.” (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.11]). Then, the panel 
concluded that, for the purpose of the panel’s jurisdiction, the measures were taken by Indonesia. 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.12], [7.17], [7.21], and [7.25]). 
 
Second, regarding harvest period requirements and the reference prices for chillies, shallots, and 
beef, Indonesia invoked Article XI.2(c) of the GATT, which is an exception to Article XI.1. (Indonesia – 
Import Licences Regimes at [7.58]). The former provision sets forth: “2. The provisions of paragraph 
1 of this Article [XI] shall not extend to the following: … (c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or 
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fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures 
which operate: … (ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product … ; …” 
 
Endorsing New Zealand’s argument, the panel rejected this defence. According to the panel, Article 
XI.2(c) became inoperative regarding agricultural measures by virtue of Article 4.2 of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, which basically ordered Members to convert quantitative restrictions on 
agricultural products into customs duties.  (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.60]). 
 
Third, a finding of a violation of a GATT provision, like Article XI.1, is not the end of the matter, since 
the GATT provides for a set of exceptions aimed at allowing WTO members to achieve non-trade goals. 
The relevant exceptions in this case raised by Indonesia were GATT Articles XX(a), (b), and (d). They 
provide as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
 (a) necessary to protect public morals;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; … 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, …  and the 




The Appellate Body has stated that the successful invocation of any defence based on this norm has 
to meet a two-tier test, so defined: “In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be 
extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular 
exceptions — paragraphs (a) to (j) — listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements 
imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX ...” (Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline at p. 22). 
 
Indonesia raised 37 exceptions to the 18 measures. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.507]). 
However, the panel dismissed 11, because they were invoked too late in the proceedings and did not 
give New Zealand the opportunity to respond to them. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at 
[7.510]). Nonetheless and despite this dismissal, the panel admitted defences regarding each of the 
measures at issue in the dispute. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.519]). It rejected all.  
 
For instance, Indonesia argued that the storage ownership requirement was justified under GATT 
Article XX(a), since the purpose of the measure was to ensure that Indonesian consumers had access 
to halal products, as mandated by Islamic law. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.637]). The 
panel responded that Indonesia had not provided evidence of the connection between the 
requirement and the protection of halal products. Nor had the regulation stated that the protection 
of halal products was one its objectives. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.655] – [7.657]). 
The panel, then, concluded that Indonesia had not demonstrated that there was a link between the 
measure and the protection of public morals as represented by halal products. (Indonesia – Import 




Indonesia invoked Article XX(d) to justify the measures establishing limited application windows and 
fixed import terms for horticultural and animal products. The panel concluded that in its invocation of 
GATT Article XX(d), Indonesia had not met even the first tier of the test, since Indonesia had failed to 
identify the specific laws and regulations that the measures sought to ensure compliance with. 
Indonesia identified these regulations only in general terms, and the panel determined that this was 
not enough. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.581] – [7.585] & [7.594]).  
 
Indonesia also invoked GATT Article XX(b) as justification for the storage ownership requirement, for 
it “is intended to ensure that fruits, vegetables and meat products for consumption are safe …” 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.662]).  The panel noted that nowhere in the regulation was 
the protection of animal, health, and/or plant life stated as a policy objective and that Indonesia had 
not demonstrated the connection between the requirement and the protection of such values. 
(Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.678] & [7.682]). 
 
Likewise, Article XX(b) was invoked by Indonesia to justify the reference prices for chillies and shallots. 
“For Indonesia, securing food supply presumes access to not only enough food to meet caloric intake, 
but also food that is safe for human consumption.” (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.770]). 
The panel responded that Indonesia had not proven that its food security concern fell under Article 
XX(b) and that nothing in the implementing regulation contemplated food safety or food security as 
an objective. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.772] – [7.775]). 
 
Article XX(b) was also raised as a defence that would justify the violation of Article XI.1 by the six-
month harvest requirement. Given the evidence, the panel agreed with Indonesia that “consumers’ 
access to fresh horticultural products … is associated with the storage of certain horticultural products 
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harvested more than six months before importation.” (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.797]). 
However, to meet the first tier of the test under this provision, respondent members had to 
demonstrate that the requirement was necessary to protect human health. To do so, and according 
to well-established WTO case law, respondents must carry out a balancing test that involves several 
elements: the importance of the value pursued the contribution of the measure to the achievement 
of the goal, the trade-restrictiveness of the measure in question, and the existence of reasonably 
available less trade-restrictive alternatives. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.799]). 
 
Regarding the contribution of the requirement to the achievement of human health, the panel stated 
that Indonesia had not addressed such contribution. On the contrary, there was evidence indicating 
that Indonesia allowed for the storage of horticultural products in its territory for more than six 
months. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.801]). The panel also found that there was a less 
trade-restrictive alternative that was reasonably available, identified by New Zealand: a certification 
requirement according to which all horticultural products must be inspected in the country of origin 
by virtue of existing Indonesian regulations. (Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes at [7.802]). The 
panel concluded that Indonesia had not proven that the requirement met the first tier of the test of 
Article XX(b).  
 
However, the panel decided to proceed with the second tier of the test: an assessment of the measure 
in light of the introductory clause to Article XX. Following the Appellate Body, the panel stated that 
“for a measure to be applied in a manner which constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail’, three elements must exist: (i) the application 
of the measure must result in discrimination; (ii) the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable 
in character; and (iii) this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions 
prevail. As the Appellate Body indicated, "t]he assessment of these factors … was part of an analysis 
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that was directed at the cause, or the rationale, of the discrimination.” (Indonesia – Import Licences 
Regimes at [7.806]). 
 
The panel found that only importers, not local distributors, had to comply with the six-month harvest 
requirement and that, therefore, there was discrimination between domestic and imported products. 
The panel concluded that the rationale for the discrimination had nothing to do with the objective of 
protecting human health and that the measure was not justified by Article XX(b). (Indonesia – Import 
Licences Regimes at [7.814], [7.823] & [7.827]). 
 
Scope of Indonesia’s Appeal before the Appellate Body 
Unhappy with the result of the panel report, Indonesia appealed it before the Appellate Body. It 
challenged the panel’s findings and conclusions based on Article XI.1 regarding all of the 18 measures, 
the panel’s findings and conclusions regarding GATT Article XX, and the panel’s findings and 
conclusions regarding Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. (Notification of an Appeal by 
Indonesia under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes at [1] – [2]). Indonesia then accepted the panel’s conclusions regarding 
private actors’ actions and the dismissal of those GATT exceptions raised late during panel proceedings. 
 
Comments on Indonesia – Import Licences Regimes 
There are a few issues worth mentioning regarding this dispute. First of all, the panel report is a 
significant application of Article XI. States can always protect their industries but quantitative 
restrictions are an exceptional tool to achieve this goal. Second, the concepts of food security and 
sovereignty cannot be deemed as having been impaired conceptually as a result of the panel report. 
The adverse result is not due to the panel’s disregard for them, but to the legal strategy pursued by 
Indonesia in its defence of the measures. In any case, those concerned with food security may keep a 
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close eye on the Appellate Body report to see how it addresses this dimension of the Indonesian 
defences. The question is not whether or not food security can fall under Article XX(b), but whether 
Indonesia has proven that food security is an objective that falls under any of the GATT exceptions. 
The first is a legal question, while the second is a factual question. A negative answer to the second 
question does not prevent a positive answer to the first.  In any case, a new negative answer by the 
Appellate Body may clarify under which conditions this proof takes place. 
 
Third, Indonesia’s defences seem at times not really strong in terms of facts and law, and such 
weakness is a bit difficult to explain. Indonesia is not new to the WTO dispute settlement system by 
any means. In fact, it prevailed not long ago against the United States in United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes. (WT/DS406/AB/R, 4 April 2012). There is no 
need to speculate much about the underlying reasons for this oddity. In any case, a full correction of 
course by Indonesia during the appeal proceedings is far from granted. Some deficiencies in terms of 
proofs will likely remain permanent. 
 
Fourth, the fact that the United States is also a complainant is a point that could favour a settlement 
of the controversy in more beneficial terms for New Zealand in the event of a positive report by the 
Appellate Body. The measures are general regulations, which are not specifically targeting New 
Zealand products. Thus, how Indonesia complies with an adverse report in its dispute with the United 
States could in principle benefit New Zealand, absent any de facto discrimination. Worth mentioning 
is the fact that Indonesia has a certain latitude in determining how it complies with an adverse report 
or, in WTO parlance, in how it will bring its measures into conformity. A powerful WTO complainant 




Fifth, when could the New Zealand industries start getting the benefits of the legal victories? In the 
event of a favourable appeal, the WTO dispute settlement system has additional stages. The next is 
the calculation of the reasonable period of implementation, or in clear terms, how quickly Indonesia 
is going to comply. Usually, the maximum is 15 months after the adoption of the panel or Appellate 
Body report by the Dispute Settlement Body. (Article 21(3)(c) of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)). The period of implementation is estimated on the basis of the type of action 
that is required to comply. Each case is different, but the late Christopher Beeby, a prominent New 
Zealand international law expert and former Appellate Body member, acting as arbitrator in Indonesia 
– Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, determined that the period of implementation 
in this case, involving administrative measures mainly, was 12 months. Beeby took into account that 
Indonesia was facing a major economic crisis at the time. (Award, Arbitration under Article 21.(3)(c) 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Indonesia – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry at [24] – [25]). No similar situation is taking place 
today, so it is likely that a shorter period of time could be granted in the event of lack of agreement 
between the parties.  
 
Thus, in the very best scenario, the NZ meat and horticultural industries could start experiencing the 
benefits of a favourable ruling by the end of 2018. Whether or not this will be the case depends also 
on the Indonesian industries’ influence in attempting to preserve a certain degree of protection from 
their government when Indonesia adopts its measures to comply with the adopted reports, which 
could trigger additional WTO litigation—compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU—and 
the ensuing delayed compliance.  
 
Finally, the remedy of the dispute settlement system is exclusively for Indonesia to bring the measures 
into conformity with WTO law after the Appellate Body report is adopted by the WTO Dispute 
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Settlement Body (Article 19 DSU). Compensation to be paid to the exporters who have seen their 
exports to Indonesia reduced as a result of the measures is not contemplated.  
 
